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THE CHANCELLOR IN LOCO PARENTIS:
MODIFICATION OF TRUSTS FOR CHILDREN

JuLIus H.

MINER*

L EGALLY

considered, a trust involves the right to the
-J beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which
is vested in another.' Its general purpose is to protect property in the interest of designated beneficiaries who are to
enjoy the income or principal or both. Through its use, in
most cases, the donor aims to provide management and control of the property which he considers superior to that which
the beneficiaries could give it. Although it may gratify the
settlor's vanity to extend beyond the grave his dominion
over property and his influence over survivors, tragic consequences of such attempts are not uncommon. Sound as the
judgment of the donor may be when the trust is made, time
and change, which mock at infallibility, often operate to
defeat his very purpose.
In the United States; private trusts have been frequently
used as a means to diminish inheritance and federal estate
taxes by preventing property from vesting in the first taker
so that it may ultimately pass free of interim taxes to other
beneficiaries in remainder. Some trusts have been created
for the payment of income to beneficiaries who would otherwise receive it out of earnings paid directly to the donors.
Others have been established for the purpose of assuming
part of the capital gain on securities thereafter to be sold.
So great has been the use thereof for such purposes that the
federal government in recent years has taken cognizance of
this legal mechanism for tax reduction and has caused the
'Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
1 Bowes v. Cannon, 50 Colo. 262, 116 P. 336 (1911);
(1878).

Weer v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490
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enactment of legislation imposing higher tax obligations and
reducing tax exemptions. The ability to modify or eliminate
provisions in instruments creating trusts, therefore, becomes
of vital importance in order to make it possible to meet unforeseen exigencies and to cope with frequent changes in tax
laws and tax regulations directed at trust estates.
It is believed that modern courts of equity have been
entirely too conservative in considering themselves bound by
the doctrine of emergency in authorizing modification of the
terms of trusts for the benefit of children. It is proposed, in
the present article, to consider the general problem of modification of private trusts and the doctrine of emergency, and
then to deal with the special problems relating to the modification of trusts where minor beneficiaries are involved.
When the extent of equitable jurisdiction over minors is considered, it will be seen that courts of equity possess ample
power to modify such trusts where benefit to the children
will result. The chancellor should consider himself as standing in loco parentis when facing such problems.
I.

MODIFICATION OF PRIVATE TRUSTS

It is an elementary principle of law that a settlor may,
in the absence of statutory restriction, reserve in the trust
instrument power to modify or revoke the trust, in whole or
in part, without affecting its validity.2 Such power may be
express or implied.3 It is personal to whomever it is delegated,4 and is not transferable or descendible.5 Where such
power is given to the trustee,' to the cestui que trust, or to
2 National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N.J. Eq. 74, 128 A. 586
(1925); Faulkner v. Irving Trust Co., 246 N.Y.S. 313 (1930); Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89, 213 N.W. 673 (1927).
8 Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N.E. 858 (1893); Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158
S.W. 624 (1913); Russell's Ex'rs. v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, 103 S.E. 652 (1920).
4 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (1928); National Newark
& Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N.J. Eq. 74, 128 A. 586 (1925); Barnard v.
Gantz, 140 N.Y. 249, 35 N.E. 430 (1893).
5 In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 A. 176, 49 A.L.R. 858 (1924).
6 Burling v. Newlands, 112 Cal. 476, 44 P. 810 (1896); Angell v. Jewett, 58 Iln.
App. 596 (1895); Gerard v. Bank of New York & Trust Company, 270 N.Y.S.
835 (1934).
7 Roberts v. Taylor, 300 F. 257 (1924); Larimer v. Beardsley, 130 Iowa 706,
107 N.W. 935 (1906); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N.E. 89 (1904); In re Innis,
106 Minn. 343, 119 N.W. 48 (1908); Dumas v. Carroll, 112 S.C. 284, 99 S.E. 801
(1919).
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a third person,' or where the power reserved is subject to
their approval,9 or is required to be exercised in a particular
manner or under special circumstances," or within a limited
time,11 the trust instrument cannot be modified or revoked
without fully complying with such provisions. A power to
revoke has been held to include a power to modify,1 2 else
the donor could first revoke and then create a new trust.
WHERE POWER IS NOT RESERVED

As a general rule, after a trust has been fully created,
without reserving a power to alter or revoke it, whether it
be a testamentary or inter vivos trust, 13 and where no statutory provision permits modification, it may not be altered or
revoked by the settlor alone, or in concert with the trustee,
without the consent of all the beneficiaries.'s The consent of
some beneficiaries will not affect the status of others. 16 A
settlor who has named himself as trustee with complete
management of and supervision over the trust property has
no implied power to modify or revoke, 7 unless he is also the
sole
beneficiary.
A reconveyance
by thethe
trustee
or with
the settlor
will 1not,
therefore, destroy
trust,to and
the
8 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 2, § 330.
9 Walker v. Sharpe, 68 N.C. 363 (1873).
10 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 2, § 330.
11 Schreyer v. Schreyer, 91 N.Y.S. 1065 (1905).
12 Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380 (1933).
13 McCartney v. Ridgway, 160 Ill. 129, 43 N.E. 826 (1895).
14 Morrison v. Nugent, 311 Ill. App. 411, 36 N.E. (2d) 581 (1941); Young v.
Young-Wishard, 227 Iowa 431, 288 N.W. 420 (1939).
15 Hurt v. Gilmer, 40 F. (2d) 794 (1930); Boyd v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 488
(1929); Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 156 N.E. 229 (1927); Burton v. Boren,
308 IlM. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923); Johnston v. Gastman, 291 Ill. 516, 126 N.E. 172
(1920); Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N.E. 659 (1914); Scheuing v. May,
213 Ill. App. 143 (1919); McCleary v. Chipman, 32 Ind. App. 489, 68 N.E. 320 (1903);
Beard v. Beard, 173 Ky. 131, 190 S.W. 703 (1917); Pacific National Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175 (1882); Watson v. Hardwick, (Mo. Sup.) 231 S.W. 964 (1921);
In re Doyle's Estate, 233 N.Y.S. 667 (1929); O'Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 160
A. 192 (1932).
16 Boyd v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 488 (1929); Johnston v. Gastman, 291 Ill.
516, 126 N.E. 172 (1920); Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N.E. 659 (1914);
State Bank of Nauvoo v. Lobdell, 78 IlL App. 600 (1898), affirmed 180 Ill. 56, 54
N.E. 157 (1899); Yeaton v. Yeaton, 4 Ill. App. 579 (1879); Kollmann v. Latonia
Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 275 Ky. 347, 121 S.W. (2d) 721 (1938).
1T Dunn v. Dunn, 219 Iowa 349, 258 N.W. 695 (1935).
18 Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 Ill. 593, 1 N.E. (2d) 59 (1936).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW

REVIEW

equitable interests of the cestuis will still attach.1 For that
matter the refusal by the trustee to accept the trust will not
20
affect its validity.
A trust may be rescinded or the instrument may be reformed in a court of equity upon the same grounds as in any
other transaction, viz: fraud,2 ' mistake, 22 mental or legal
incapacity of the donor,2 3 failure of consideration, duress,
and undue influence.2 4 Rescission will be decreed only upon
a mistake of fact and not of law,2 5 notwithstanding a recent
New Jersey decision to the contrary.2 6
To what extent, and under what circumstances, may
equitable jurisdiction be invoked to authorize a deviation
from the express provisions of the trust or to sanction acts
by the trustee which he is given no power to do? Most of our
19 Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927); Binns v. La Forge,
191 Ill. 598, 61 N.E. 382 (1901); Williams v. Evans, 154 fIl. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895);
Hinton's Ex'r. v. Hinton's Committee, 256 Ky. 345, 76 S.W. (2d) 8 (1934); Krauch
v. Krauch, 179 Md. 423, 20 A. (2d) 719 (1941); Rednor v. First Mechanics Nat.
Bank of Trenton, 131 N.J. Eq. 141, 24 A. (2d) 850 (1942).
20 Burbach v. Burbach, 217 fl1. 547, 75 N.E. 519 (1905).
21

Brophy v. Lawler, 107 IIl. 284 (1883).

22

Deischer v. Price, 148 IIl. 383, 36 N.E. 105 (1894).

23

65 C.J. 331, § 88.

24

Taylor v. Buttrick, 165 Mass. 547, 43 N.E. 507 (1896).

25 Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899); Coolidge v. Loring,
235 Mass. 220, 126 N.E. 276 (1920).
26 In Reuther v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 81 at 85, 172 A. 386 at
388 (1934), Reuther turned over all of his savings under an irrevocable trust executed by his wife as donor. The court there permitted revocation because it concluded that: "While he probably understood all that was contained therein, he did
not realize the practical effect and consequences which might flow from things
not stated, such as the omission of a clause giving Mrs. Reuther the definite right
to revoke... Had he been told that . . . he could have insisted upon the insertion
of such a clause." The Court also pointed out that if it should be held that, without such a clause, the agreement was irrevocable, then the gift thereby made
was unwise and improvident and should be set aside, because it divested the
settlors of practically all their savings and put it out of their power to resort to
any fund with which to tide themselves over lean years which might result as a
natural business risk. It concluded that the interests of the infant beneficiaries
"cannot accrue unless they survive the father and mother, and they may not live
to take, and, should they take, it would be at a time when they are of age and
able to find for themselves. They need now, during their infancy, the support
and care which their parents will be better able to provide, if the parents have
funds to use for the purpose." In Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918
(1899), the court held a claim that the grantor did not comprehend the legal effect
of the instrument was no basis for vacating it, where no allegation of mistake or
misunderstanding was advanced.
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courts
follow the English authorities" which permit
changes in, or the termination of, a trust before its expiration where all the beneficiaries interested in the estate are
properly before the court, where all are sui juris, where all
are legally capable of consenting, and where all do consent.2 9
-It would seem unreasonable, and even against public policy,
to restrain the owners, legal or beneficial, from using or
disposing of property in which they alone are interested."0
It has even been held that consenting beneficiaries, with the
settlor's consent, may have modification or partial revocation, provided the interests of the non-consenting beneficiaries, or those under legal incapacity to consent, are not
affected, 8 ' and if the complete continuance of the trust is not
necessary to carry out a material purpose.12 In each instance, the court will be careful, however, not to defeat any
object of the settlor.3 3
Where not all the beneficiaries consent to the termina27 Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93, 56 S. Ct. 68, 80 L. Ed. 76 (1935); Stier v.
Nashville Trust Co., 158 F. 601 (1908); Moore v. Vawter, 84 Cal. App. 678, 258 P.
622 (1927); Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1916); Eakle v.
Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 P. 566 (1904); Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 159 N.E.
229 (1927); Suiter v. McWard, 328 Ill. 462, 159 N.E. 799 (1928); Cary v. Cary, 309
Ila. 330, 141 N.E. 156 (1923); Burton v. Boren, 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923);
Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N.E. 498 (1911); Wilce v. Van Anden, 248 Iln. 358, 94
N.E. 42 (1911); Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N.E. 409 (1905); Thompson v.
Adams, 205 Iln. 552, 69 N.E. 1 (1903); Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523
(1898); Matthews v. Thompson, 186 Mass. 14, 71 N.E. 93 (1904); Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., 194 N.Y.S. 614 (1922); O'Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 160 A. 192
(1932); Armistead's Ex'rs v. Hartt, 97 Va. 316, 33 S.E. 616 (1899). See also Underhill, Trusts and Trustees, 8th Ed., Art. 46, par. 2.
28 In re New, [19011 2 Ch. 534; Neill v. Neill, [1904] 1 I. R. 513.
29 Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956 (1912).
50 Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 F. 601 (1908); Burton v. Boren, 308 Ill. 440,
139 N.E. 868 (1923).
51 Boyd v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 488 (1929); State Bank of Nauvoo v. Lobdell, 78 InI. App. 600 (1898), affirmed 180 Inl. 56, 54 N.E. 157 (1899); Wayman v.
Follansbee, 253 Ill. 602, 98 N.E. 21 (1912); Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104
N.E. 659 (1914); Anderson v. Kemper, 116 Ky. 339, 76 S.W. 122 (1903).
32 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 2, § 330; McDonnell v. McDonnell, 114 F. (2d) 478
(1940); Whittingham v. California Trust Co., 214 Cal. 128, 4 P. (2d) 142 (1931);
Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1916); Wayman v. Follansbee,
253 Ill. 602, 98 N.E. 21 (1912); Buschbaum v. National Bank of Logansport, 102
Ind. App. 679, 4 N.E. (2d) 671 (1936); Weeks v. Pierce, 279 Mass. 108, 181 N.E.
231 (1932).
88 Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N.E. 659 (1914); Watson v. Watson,
223 Mass. 425, 111 N.E. 904 (1916); Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S.W. (2d)
644 (1931).
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tion of the trust and some of its purposes are unfulfilled, the
court will not direct its termination. 34 Likewise, the failure
of a cestui to answer a complaint for construction of a trust
will not warrant an adjudication to terminate it when that
relief is not sought. 35 Where there are beneficiaries who do
not or cannot legally consent, or are unascertained, or are
not in being, the court will not terminate the trust in the
absence of statutory authority.36 So also, 37where there is a
spendthrift clause in the trust instrument.
As to just who are beneficiaries required to consent to
revocation or modification will depend upon whether the interests which such persons have in the trust estate possess
the attributes of descendibility, devisability or alienability.3
Consent of possible unborn remaindermen has been held unnecessary to terminate a trust when the person who would
have taken at the death of the life tenant was living and
consented to termination. 9
Approval by the trustee to terminate the trust has held
both necessary" and unnecessary4 ' unless, of course, he is
34 McDonnell v. McDonnell, 114 F. (2d) 478 (1940); Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328
Ill. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691 (1916);
Buschbaum v. National Bank of Logansport, 102 Ind. App. 679, 4 N.E. (2d) 671
(1936).
35 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Laws, 217 N. C. 171, 7 S.E. (2d) 470 (1940).
36 Hurt v. Gilmer, 40 F. (2d) 794 (1930); Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637,
154 P. 306 (1916); Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N.E. 659 (1914); Schaal
v. Schaal, 203 Iowa 667, 213 N.W. 207 (1927); In re McKenney's Will, 169 Md. 640,
182 A. 425 (1936); Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952
(1905); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 P. 554 (1924); In re Grazier's
Estate, 301 Pa. 422, 152 A. 390 (1930); In re Jones' Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 90, 130 A.
314 (1925); Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S.W. 79 (1925).
37 Bowlin v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S.W. 288 (1917); Maher
v. Maher, 207 Ky. 366, 269 S.W. 287 (1925); In re Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 129
N.E. 646 (1920); Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 153 N.Y.S. 1041 (1915).
38 Franklin v. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 255 N.Y.S. 115 (1932);
Gage v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 225 N.Y.S. 476 (1927); Phelps v. Thompson,
198 N.Y.S. 320 (1922); Sperry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 139 N.Y.S. 192
(1913).
39 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Howland, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) Oct. 18, 1937, as
reported in N.Y.L.J. of that date, p. 1059, col. 2. See also note thereon in 51
Harv. L. Rev. 754.
40 Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 84 N.Y.S. 183 (1903); Dumas v. Carroll, 112
S.C. 284, 99 S.E. 801 (1919).
41 Rose v. Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931);
In re Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 A. 222 (1917); Armistead's Ex'rs v. Hartt,
97 Va. 316, 33 S.E. 616 (1899).
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also a beneficiary. Without any beneficial interest in the trust,
the trustee's objections to dissolution of the trust will not be
recognized.2 In the absence of a specific grant of power to
the trustee by the settlor, or by statute, the trustee has no
power to change any of the terms of the trust instrument,4 3
or terminate the trust, except as therein provided. 44 The
trustee's powers are only those defined in the instrument and
he must comply therewith or else he may incur personal
liability.4 5
Where the trustee is uncertain of his powers or duties,
he may and should apply to the court for directions, 46 for
he cannot sit by complacently and permit dissipation of the
trust res.4 7 In fact, he may become subject to liability if he
fails to apply for permission to deviate from the terms of the
instrument, if he knows or should know of the existence of
circumstances requiring the change.48 Only in the event of
an emergency may a trustee deviate from the trust instrument without first obtaining permission of the court and then
only if, in such emergency, he has no opportunity to apply.
Courts have, however, condoned profitable deviations by
trustees who had not first applied for authority.4 9 On the
other hand, courts have been reluctant to exercise a trustee's
discretion 50 and have frequently refused to guide the trustee
where they felt that interpretation was unnecessary. 1
Courts of equity have sanctioned modification or termination of trusts where accomplishment of the trust purpose
42 Western Battery & Supply Co. v. Hazelett Stor. Battery Co., 61 F. (2d) 220
(1932); Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 P. 566 (1904).
43 Burling v. Newlands, 112 Cal. 476, 44 P. 810 (1896); Angell v. Jewett, 58 Ill.
App. 596 (1895); Turner v. Spicer, 91 N. J. Eq. 412, 110 A. 41 (1920); Gerard v.
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 270 N. Y. S. 835 (1934).
44 Woddrop v. Weed, 154 Pa. 307, 26 A. 375 (1893); Cox v. Cox, 95 Va. 173, 27 S.E.
834 (1897); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N.W. 909 (1904).
45 In re Cole's Estate, 102 Wis. 1, 78 N.W. 402 (1899).
46 Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill.
113, 73 N.E. 409 (1905); Laughlin v. Wells Bldg.
Co., 169 Wis. 50, 171 N.W. 755 (1919).
47 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill.
21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Young v. Young, 255
Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931); Delafield v. Barret, 270 N. Y. 43, 200 N.E. 67 (1936).
48 Grennan v. Pierce, 229 Mass. 292, 118 N.E. 301 (1918).
49 Shirk v. Soper, 144 Md. 269, 124 A. 911 (1923); Brown v. Hazelhurst, 54 Md.
26 (1880); Williams v. Smith, 10 R. I. 280 (1872).
50 McCarthy v. Tierney, 116 Conn. 588, 167 A. 807 (1933); Foley v. Hastings, 107
Conn. 9, 139 A. 305 (1927).
51 Shurtleff v. Schoenleber, 106 Neb. 870, 184 N.W. 814 (1921).
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has become impossible or illegal;52 where the trust has become dry or passive, as where its purposes have been fully
accomplished;" or where there is no longer any valid reason
for preserving the trust.5 4 The same is true where there is
no purpose other than payment of income, 5 or trustee's
fees,5" or if all the interests under the trust have vested. 7
In like manner where the courts have found that administration of the trust was extremely difficult and onerous,58 or
too costly, or its continuance was not, in the opinion of the
court, for the best interest of the cestui,5 9 they have ordered
the termination thereof.
Contrary to the express intention of a testator, courts of
equity have even subjected the interests of beneficiaries of
spendthrift trusts, cloaked with every form of legal immunity, to claims which have "an unusual moral appeal or are
affected, to an unusual degree, by public interest,"'0 such as
those for taxes or for the support of the beneficiary's wife
and children.6 1 The reasoning in some of the cases in which
52 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 17 S. Ct. 401, 41 L. Ed. 739 (1897); Miller's
Ex'rs. v. Miller's Heirs & Creditors, 172 Ky. 519, 189 S.W. 417 (1916); Donaldson
v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S.W. 1151 (1904); In re Harrar's Estate, 244 Pa. 542, 91 A.
503 (1914); Armistead's Ex'rs. v. Hartt, 97 Va. 316, 33 S.E. 616 (1899).

53 Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N.E. 498 (1911); Felgner v. Hooper, 80 Md. 262,
30 A. 911 (1894); Brown v. Cowell, 116 Mass. 461 (1875); Harlow v. Cowdrey, 109
Mass. 183 (1872).
54 Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 P. 425 (1920);
Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1916); Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S.W. 537 (1925).
55 In re Buch's Estate, 278 Pa. 185, 122 A. 239 (1923).
56 Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 P. 566 (1904).
57 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W. (2d) 814
(1937); Smith & Others v. Harrington, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 566 (1862).

55 Suwle v. Potter, 223 Ky. 136, 3 S.W. (2d) 174 (1928). In Restatement, Trusts,
Vol. 2, § 336, appears the language: "If owing to circumstances not known to
settlor and not anticipated by him the continuance of the trust would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust, the court
will direct or permit termination of the trust."
59 Haldeman's Trustee v. Haldeman, 239 Ky. 717, 40 S.W. (2d) 348 (1931);
Schriver v. Frommel, 179 Ky. 228, 200 S.W. 327 (1918). See also Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691 (1916); In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11, 130
A. 238 (1925).
60 Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests (Burdette Smith Company, Chicago, 1941) p. 563, § 434.
61 Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. App. 198 (1936); Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552
(1929), affirmed in 341 Ill. 36, 173 N.E. 175 (1930); England v. England, 223 Ill.
App. 549 (1922); Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 44 N.E. 169 (1896).
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such claims have been allowed is that, upon a proper construction of the trust agreement, the claimants were considered as beneficiaries rather than creditors. It has also
been held that income from a spendthrift trust, otherwise
immune to creditors, is subject to an attorney's lien for services rendered in protecting and enforcing the rights and interests of the beneficiary who hired him. 2
Where the entire legal estate and all equitable interests
have become vested in the same person, the courts will
decree the trust extinguished by merger, as when the cestui
assigns his interest to the trustee, or the trustee conveys his
legal title to the cestui, or both convey their respective interests to a third party. In such event, the protection of the
beneficiary, which is the primary purpose of the trust, is no
longer necessary and there is no further reason for the separation of the equitable and legal titles.6 3 Redelivery by the
trustee to the donor not in accordance with the provisions of
64
the trust instrument will not, however, terminate the trust.
MODIFICATION-THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE

Our courts of chancery have almost uniformly directed
trustees to deviate from the express terms of the trust agreement in the event of an emergency,6 or for the preservation
of the estate or the income therefrom for the cestui que
trust. 66 The necessity for such action must be shown as
62 In re Williams, 187 N.Y. 286, 79 N.E. 1019 (1907). See also Restatement,
Trusts, Vol. 1, § 157; Carey and Schuyler, op. cit., p. 563, § 434; 36 ll. L. Rev. 674.
63 Coryell v. Klehm, 157 Ill. 462, 41 N.E. 864 (1895); Brophy v. Lawler, 107 Ill.
284 (1883); Cunningham v. Bright, 228 Mass. 385, 117 N.E. 909 (1917); Langley v.
Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N.E. 1064 (1912).
64 Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691 (1916); Williams v. Evans, 154
11. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895).
In Curtiss v. Brown, 29
65 Black v. Bailey, 142 Ark. 201, 218 S.W. 210 (1920).
Ill. 201 at 228 (1862), the court said: "That the terms of the deed, creating the
trust, are like iron bands, rigid and unyielding, and that no human power can
unloose or even adjust them, no matter what emergency or necessity may arise,
even though they may destroy the whole interest designed for the beneficiary . • *
We do not think so great a defect exists in our system of jurisprudence." See also
Nail v. American Nat. Bank of Bristow, 21 F. Supp. 385 (1937); Adams v. Cook,
15 Cal. (2d) 352, 101 P. (2d) 484 (1940); Porter v. Porter, (Sup. Ct., Me.) 20 A.
(2d) 465 (1941); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Laws, 217 N.C. 171, 7 S.E. (2d)
470 (1940).
66 Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co. of Hartford, 116 Conn. 320, 164 A.
656 (1933); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691 (1916); Young v. Young,
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being required to check depletion of the res or to insure continuance of a reasonable income. 67 Variation may be sanctioned under such conditions even though the testator foresaw the future change in circumstances and expressly in6
sisted upon adherence to his instructions.
In case of such emergency, courts of equity will enlarge
the power of a trustee contrary to the express provisions of
the instrument, 9 or direct a change in trust administration
or management when necessary to accomplish trust purposes. Without regard to adverse terms, courts will authorize the trustee to lease,70 sell, mortgage, convert, alter and
improve real estate,7 ' and to dispose of precarious invest255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931); N.J. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage & T. G. Co., 105 N.J. Eq. 557, 148 A. 713 (1930); Cutter v. American Trust
Co., 213 N.C. 686, 197 S.E. 542 (1938). See also Austin W. Scott, Deviation from the
Terms of a Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1025 (1931), and note in 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
1000. In Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640 at 648, 49 N.E. 523 at 526 (1898), the court
said: ". . . that power can only be justified by some exigency which makes the
action of the court, in a sense, indispensable to the preservation of the interests
of the parties in the subject matter of the trust, or, possibly, in case of some
other necessity of the most urgent character."
67 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Vickers v. Vickers,
189 Ky. 323, 225 S.W. 44 (1920); Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 65
N.J. Eq. 11, 55 A. 468 (1903).
68 In the case of In re New, [1901] 2 Ch. 534, the settlor expressly provided that
the trust res should "continue in the same state of investment in which It should
be found at the time of his demise, notwithstanding the same might be of a
wasting or hazardous nature."

69 Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N.E. 409 (1905);
Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926).

Colonial Trust Co. v.

70 Patterson v. Johnson, 113 Ill. 559 (1885); Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N.E.
306 (1900).

71 United States v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 31 S. Ct. 37, 54 L. Ed. 1123 (1910); Thaw
v. Falls, 136 U. S. 519, 10 S. Ct. 1037, 34 L. Ed. 531 (1890); Russell v. Russell, 109
Conn. 187, 145 A. 648 (1929); Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795 (1927);
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926); Richards v. East
Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co., 106 Ga. 614, 33 S.E. 193 (1899); Northern Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 336 Ill. 137, 168 N.E. 116 (1929); Cary v. Cary, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N.E.
156 (1923); Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Packard v.
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 261 Ill. 450, 104 N.E. 275 (1914); Roberts v. Roberts,
259 Ill. 115, 102 N.E. 239 (1913); King v. King, 215 Ill. 100, 74 N.E. 89 (1905);
Denegre v. Walker, 214 Il. 113, 73 N.E. 409 (1905); Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263,
56 N.E. 307 (1900); Gorman v. Mullins, 172 Ill. 349, 50 N.E. 222 (1898); Gavin v.
Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898); Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N.E. 858 (1893);
Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887); Allman v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 185
(1881); Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S.W. 1057 (1921); Warren v. Pazolt, 203
Mass. 328, 89 N.E. 381 (1909); Price v. Long, 87 N.J. Eq. 578, 101 A. 195 (1917);
In re Pulitzer's Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (1931).
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ments, 2 or an unprofitable business.
Changes of circumstances from those which existed at
the creation of the trust, which necessitate alteration of its
terms, are generally divided into two classes, viz: those
where the settlor has failed to provide for the relief sought, 74
and those where he has expressly prohibited it. 75 It is readily

understandable that if courts of equity have power to approve
that which the trustee was given no power to do, then they
can also sanction that which the trustee was precluded from
doing.76
Where the chief purpose of the trust is to support its
beneficiaries, but owing to conditions not anticipated by the
donor the earnings are insufficient, invasion of so much of the
principal as is necessary to carry out that purpose is usually
decreed by the chancellor. Both English and American
out of
courts have authorized either an increased allowance
7
income 77 or a withdrawal from the corpus itself.
While the English courts have been a bit reticent in ordering conversion of an infant's real estate into personalty
72 In re Pulitzer's Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87, at 93 (1931), the court said: "The law
in the case of necessity reads into the will an implied power of sale." In re
Muller's Will, 280 N.Y.S. 345 (1935), the court denied the right to depart from the
class of legal investments because of probable inflation. The court held it was
futile to indulge in such probabilities and that it had no power to disregard the
command of the legislature in that regard.
73 Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795 (1921); Price v. Long, 87 N.J. Eq.
578, 101 A. 195 (1917).
74 Toronto General Trusts Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 138 N.Y. 657, 34 N.E.
514 (1893), affirming 18 N.Y.S. 593 (1892).
75 Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N.E. 306 (1900); Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201
(1862); Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S.W. 927 (1917); Upham v. Plankinton, 166 Wis. 271, 165 N.W. 18 (1917).
76 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Longwith v. Riggs,
123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887); Denegre v. Walker, 114 Ill. App. 234 (1904); Marsh
v. Reed, 64 Ill. App. 535 (1896); Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S.W. 927
(1917).
77 Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917); Bennett v. Nashville Trust
Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S.W. 840 (1913); Aynsworth v. Pratchett, 13 Ves. Jr. 321, 33
Eng. Rep. 314 (1807).
Some courts de78 Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 21, 24 Eng. Rep. 625 (1722).
creed advances even when the beneficiary's absolute interests were contingent,
with a remainder over if the beneficiary should die before the age fixed for absolute investiture. Greenwell v. Greenwell, 5 Ves. Jr. 194, 31 Eng. Rep. 541
(1800); Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887); Knorr v. Millard, 52
Mich. 542, 18 N.W. 349 (1884); In re Lucey's Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 314, 128 A. 677
(1925); Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S.W. 79 (1925).
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to insure better earning, they have been very liberal in their
attitude on maintenance and education of minors."9 In fact,
English statutes give trustees sole discretion in making such
allowances. 80 They will not, however, direct a trustee to pay
to one beneficiary a part of a fund which the testator has
provided for the benefit of another,"' or permit an advance
from the corpus of the estate which would constitute an
award to a cestui que trust not ultimately entitled to it.82
Although it is firmly established that the regulation and
control of trusts is one of the original and inherent powers
of chancery, 8 most of our courts hold to the view that they
owe it to the settlor to direct that the property be dealt with
in accordance with his express intention, except where it
clearly appears that deviation is urgently necessary for the
preservation of the estate or its income, or where performance is otherwise impossible or illegal. They still adhere to
84
the indestructible trust theory laid down in Claflin v. Claflin,
that equity ought not to revoke gifts, reduce or increase fixed
donations or presents to beneficiaries contrary to express
provisions made by the settlor. In the absence of emergency
or dire necessity therefor, they refuse to authorize modification of trust instruments merely because such would be
advantageous to beneficiaries, even though such beneficiaries are minors.8 5
79 Aynsworth v. Pratchett, 13 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 314 (1807); Harvey v.
Harvey, 2 P. Wins. 21, 24 Eng. Rep. 625 (1722).
80 See note in 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1000.
81 Hughes v. Federal Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 502, 183 A. 299 (1936); In re Lucey's
Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 314, 128 A. 677 (1925). In Errat v. Barlow, 14 Ves. Jr. 201, 33
Eng. Rep. 498 (1807), an allowance was denied because it might affect an interest
of persons not yet in esse.
82 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Conrad, 269 Ky. 359, 107 S.W. (2d) 248 (1937); In
re Lucey's Estate, 98 N.J. Eq. 314, 128 A. 677 (1925).
83 Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 21 S. Ct. 845, 45 L. Ed. 1183 (1901); Thompson v. Emmett Irr. Dist., 227 F. 560 (1915); Frackelton v. Masters, 249 Inl. 30, 94
N.E. 124 (1911); Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887); Dodge, Conservator v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338 (1881); N.J. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Lincoln Mortg. &
T. G. Co., 105 N.J. Eq. 557, 148 A. 713 (1930).
84 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454, 3 L.R.A. 370.(1889).
85 Atkinson v. Lyle, 191 Ark. 61, 85 S.W. (2d) 715 (1935); Russell v. Russell, 109
Conn. 187, 145 A. 648 (1929); Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 90
Conn. 63, 96 A. 149 (1915); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691 (1916);
Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384,
95 N.E. 498 (1911); Johnston v. Buck, 220 Il. 226, 77 N.E. 163 (1906); Johns v.
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MODIFICATION OF TRUSTS FOR CHILDREN

In England, Lord Chancellor Macclesfield was among
the early jurists to recognize the need for modification of
trust agreements for minor beneficiaries,"6 but, in 1845, ViceChancellor Sir J. L. Knight Bruce declared that although he
believed that the proposed arrangement before him would
be for the benefit of the infant, he did not consider that he
had jurisdiction to sanction it; that it would mean in effect
to "unsettle property already subject to .the terms of a settlement, and that Parliament alone has authority to do."18 7
In 1903, however, Justice Farwell refused to follow that
theory88 and held that guardians and trustees may change
the nature of infant's estates, under particular circumstances, where such change was for the advantage or convenience of the infant, and that when made the court would
approve such deviation. He decreed that a court of chancery
had the power to compromise the rights and claims of infants and persons under disability, where those rights and
claims were equitable; that such power had been continually
exercised by the court and resulted almost necessarily from
the jurisdiction which the court exercised over trustees. He
further stated that "in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the
Court may in general order the trustees to deal with the
trust property in whatever mode it may consider to be for
the benefit of cestuis que trust who are infants or under
disabilities.'"89
To the same effect is the case of In re New,9 0 in which
the trustees, in the interest of their cestuis que trustent, of
whom some were persons not sui juris and others were not
yet in existence, applied for leave to reorganize and expand
Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N.E. 337 (1898); Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S.W. 1057
(1921); Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952 (1905);
In re Roe, 119 N.Y. 509, 23 N.E. 1063 (1890); In re Buch's Estate, 278 Pa. 185,
122 A. 239 (1923); In re Caswel's Will, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N.W. 235 (1928); In re
Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N.W. 267 (1924).
86 Richmond v. Tayleur, 1 P. Wins. 734, 24 Eng. Rep. 591 (1721).
ST Day v. Day, 9 Jur. 785 (1845); Peto v. Gardner, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 312, 63 Eng.
Rep. 137 (1843).
88 In re Wells, [1903) 1 Ch. 848.
89 [1903] 1 Ch. 848 at 854.
90 In re New, [1901) 2 Ch. 534.
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a company because of its tremendous growth and huge earnings. The court held that although the testator expressly
provided that the res should "continue in the same state of
investment in which it should be found," the court could
authorize going beyond the trust instrument "where the circumstances require that something should be done." 91
Justice Buckley, on the other hand, insisted in the same
year as the decision in the preceding case that in his opinion
there did not reside in the court any power to authorize
trustees, on the ground that such action was beneficial, to
take an interest which the testator had not authorized. 2 The
same reasoning was followed by Justice Kekewich two years
later.9 8
In Curtiss v. Brown,9 4 frequently cited and relied upon
by American authorities, the court rejected the suggestion
that the terms of the deed creating the trust were like iron
bands, rigid and unyielding, and that no human power could
unloose or even adjust them, no matter what emergency or
necessity might arise, and even though such emergencies
might destroy the whole interest designed for the beneficiary. In support of such refusal, the court said: "We do not
think so great a defect exists in our system of jurisprudence." 9 Most subsequent decisions hold, however, that the
exercise of such power can only be warranted by some exigency which makes the action imperative for the preservation of the interests of the beneficiaries. In the absence of
dire necessity they have declined modification solely to increase income"e or to adopt a better and more advantageous
plan of administration.9 7 Where modification has been sanctioned, although not indispensable to preserve the trust, the
question involved was one relating to the administration of
the trust and a more judicious mode of managing and controlling the subject matter thereof in order that the design
91 [1901 2 Ch. 534 at 543.
92 In re Morrison, 1901 1 Ch. 701.
93 In re Tollemache, [19031 1 Ch. 457.
94 29 Ill.
201 (1862).
95 29 Ill.
201 at 228.
98 Williams v. Williams, 204 Ill. 44, 68 N.E. 449 (1903); Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill.
472, 50 N.E. 337 (1898).
97 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 II. 21, 106 N.E. 497 (1914); Johnson v. Buck, 220
ill. 226, 77 N.E. 163 (1906).
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and wishes of the donor might be more completely accomplished.9 8
BY COMPROMISE OF MINOR'S CLAIMS

Our courts are liberal in favoring settlements in litigation involving interests of minor beneficiaries. They hold
almost uniformly that when a court of equity assumes jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, some of
whom are infants, it is incumbent upon the court to protect
and adjudicate upon all personal and property interests of
such infants, even beyond the express terms of the trust,
wherever it is for their benefit and convenience. To hold
otherwise would result in adults being assured of more adequate relief and protection than would minors when their
property interests are involved in litigation.
The action by courts of equity in compromising litigation
affecting estates of minors has become so prevalent, 9" that
some of our states have enacted statutes making such compromise of litigation arising out of testamentary trusts in
favor of minors binding on all parties. 1°° Such action is considered and approved as a contractual disposition of property rather than a modification of the terms of the trust
instrument, 10 ' provided no rights of adults or other minors
are prejudiced thereby. 02
In such cases it has been held that the consent of a
guardian is not necessary to affect a compromise and that a
trustee may retain control of a minor's estate against the
minor's guardian. 10 3 A guardian or next friend has, of
course, no right to bind an infant or incompetent party by a
98 Northern Trust Co. v. Thompson, 336 Ill. 137, 168 N.E. 116 (1929).
See also
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926); Marsh v. Reed, 184
Ill. 263, 56 N.E. 306 (1900); Packard v. Illinois T. & S. Bank, 261 Ill. 450, 104 N.E.
275 (1914).
99 Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & R. Co., 168 U. S. 451, 18 S. Ct. 121, 42
L. Ed. 539 (1897); Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927); Matthews
v. Doner, 292 Ill. 592, 127 N.E. 137 (1920); Williams v. Williams, 204 M. 44, 68
N.E. 449 (1903); Walsh v. Walsh, 116 Mass. 377 (1874); Gifford v. First Nat. Bank
of Menominee, 285 Mich. 58, 280 N.W. 108 (1938); Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich.
324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923).
100 Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923).
101 In re Ellis, 228 Mass. 39, 116 N.E. 956 (1917); Appeal of Hannan, 227 Mich.
569, 199 N.W. 423 (1924).
102 Morris v. Morris, 45 Tex. 60, 99 S.W. 872 (1907).
103 Finch v. Miller, 178 Ga. 37, 172 S.E. 25 (1933); Metzner v. Newman, 224
Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923); Wilson v. Schaefer, 107 Tenn. 300, 64 S.W. 208
(1901).
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consent decree."" But while it is the duty of the court to
protect the interests of minors and persons under disability,-1° and to make certain by competent proof that the compromise is fair, a consent decree thus entered will not be
reversed if found to be beneficial to the incompetent party or
to the minor. If it is unfair and prejudicial, it will be reversed
or modified. 06
In sustaining a compromise agreement involving property rights of infants, Mr. Justice Brewer, of the United
States Supreme Court declared that:
It would be strange indeed if, when those authorized to represent minors,
acting in good faith, make a settlement of claims in their behalf, and such
settlement is submitted to the proper tribunal, and after examination by
that tribunal is found to be advantageous to the minors and approved by
a decree entered of record, such settlement and decree can thereafter be
set aside and held for naught on the ground that subsequent disclosures
and changed conditions make it obvious that the settlement was not in
fact for the interests of the minors, and that it would have been better for
them to have retained rather than compromised their claims. If such a
rule ever comes to be recognized it will work injury rather than benefit
to the interests of minors, for no one will make any settlement of such
claims for fear that it may thereafter be repudiated. The best interests
of minors require that things that are done in their behalf honestly,
fairly, upon proper investigation and with the approval of the appropriate tribunal shall be held as binding upon them as similar action
10 7
taken by adults.
104 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lasca, 79 Kan. 311, 99 P. 616, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 308
(1909); Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107, 23 N.W. 606 (1885).
105 Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284, 141 N.E. 209 (1923); Dodge, Conservator v.
Cole, 97 Ill. 338 (1881).
106 Milly v. Win. Harrison, Executor, 47 Tenn. (7 Coldw.) 191 (1869). In Brooke
v. Lord Mostyn, 33 Beav. 457, 55 Eng. Rep. 445 (1864), the court said: "If, in
the course of a suit or any other proceeding in this Court, a compromise is proposed between one or more adult persons and one or more infants, the Court
takes steps to ascertain whether it will be for the benefit of the infant or infants
that the proposed compromise should be accepted. . . In dealing with such a
question, it is the duty of a Judge (and, as I believe, a duty always performed
by him) to consider carefully the facts, and to determine, upon such consideration, what is best to be done for the infant, in like manner as a father would
act for a son in similar circumstance. No doubt in such cases, especially when
the result of this evidence is doubtful, the Court is much influenced by the opinion
of the nearest relatives and guardians of the infant, who have no interest in the
matter except to promote the advantage of the child. When this has been done,
and the Court has decided in favour of the arrangement, and the arrangement
has been thereupon carried into execution, the whole thing is concluded."
107 Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & R. Co., 168 U. S. 451 at 465, 18 S. Ct.
121, 42 L. Ed. 539 at 545 (1897).
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The case of Metzner v. Newman,108 is one of the leading
cases involving such compromises in American courts. The
testator therein left surviving four children and four grandchildren, and provided in his will that the residue of his
estate be held in trust to be divided in equal shares among
the four grandchildren when the youngest reached majority,
the issue of any of them to take, by representation, the share
of their parents in the event of death. During the pendency
of litigation contesting the will, the family entered into a
compromise agreement including a provision that the residue be divided equally among the testator's four children
and four grandchildren. Objections were filed to the administrator's final account because the estate was administered
in pursuance of the compromise agreement. The probate
court sustained the objections and two infant legatees appealed on the ground that the settlement was fair and for the
best interest of the infant legatees. The chancellor approved
the compromise, but the guardian ad litem appealed, taking
the position that a court of chancery has no power to entertain such proceedings. The Supreme Court of Michigan said:
An examination of the authorities upon the question of the jurisdiction of
the court leads us to the conclusion that when a chancery court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties, some of whom are infants,
it may pass upon and adjudicate the rights and equities of the infants and
the decree will be binding as to them. We are also of the opinion that
when infants' property rights are involved in litigation the general
guardian or guardian ad litem may negotiate for a compromise of the
litigation, and if the court approves it, after an examination of the facts,
the judgment or decree will be binding upon the infants. After a somewhat extended research we have found no case which disputes this rule
of procedure . . . If appellant's contention were the law it would be

difficult for a chancery court to dispose of suits involving the rights of
infants. While it is generally held that general guardians and guardians
ad litem may not compromise pending litigation so as to be binding upon
the infant it is just as generally held that when the terms of the compromise are examined by the court and approved, it is legal and binding.
Indeed, if this were not true, as one of the counsel has well suggested,
then infants would have fewer rights than adults when their property
rights were involved in litigation. 109
108
109

224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923).
224 Mich. 324 at 330, 194 N.W. 1008 at 1010.
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The Illinois Supreme Court has also passed upon this
question.11 In the case of Williams v. Williams,"" after
citing numerous decisions upholding the power of a chancery
court to authorize the settlement of infants' rights in litigation, the court quoted with approval from the Tennessee
case of Reynolds v. Brandon to the effect that:
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce and ratify contracts for
the compromise of doubtful rights is too well settled to require to be supported by authorities.... Whenever a court of Chancery is called upon to
sanction and enforce a contract of compromise, which involves the
rights and interests of minors, it is bound, in the exercise of its general
superintendence and protective jurisdiction over the persons and property of infants, to see that their rights and interests are not injuriously
affected by such contract. They must have their day in court; they must
be represented by guardians ad litem; the proof must satisfy the conscience of the Chancellor that their rights and interests are promoted
and secured by the compromise. When these requisites are complied
with, it is not simply the right, but the duty of the Chancellor to uphold
and enforce such compromises, especially where they settle family disputes and put an end to litigation as to doubtful rights. If the Chancery
Court could not exercise its jurisdiction for the protection of the rights
and interests of minors in such cases,2 the law extends to them less pro1
tection than it extends to adults ....

The Reynolds case had, in turn, quoted with approval from
Trigg v. Read, in which the court said:
In the cases of family compromise, all that need be said here is that
agreements affecting them are upheld with a strong hand, and an equity

has been administered in regard to them, which has not been applied to
agreements generally, upon the ground that the honor and peace of
families makes it just and proper to do so. 113

Where the trustee insisted that the court had no jurisdiction to approve a settlement because unborn issue of the
parties were not, as a class, represented by any person made
a party to the complaint, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Wolf v. Uhlemann,"4 stated:
110 Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927); Matthews v. Doner, 292
Ill. 592, 127 N.E. 137 (1920); Williams v. Williams, 204 Ill. 44, 68 N.E. 449 (1903).
111 204 Ill. 44, 68 N.E. 449 (1903).
112 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 593 at 605 (1870).
118 24 Tenn. (5 Humphr.) 528 at 545 (1845).
165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927).
114 325 MII.
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The theory upon which the unborn members of a class are bound by
representation of other members of the same class is, that the interests
of the members of the class present in court are such that they are
equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question so as to
give the contingent interests effective protection. The doctrine of class
representation has long been recognized in this and other jurisdictions.
There can be no question under the authorities that the remaindermen
not in esse were represented by living members of the same class who
are parties to the suit and that the decree protects appellant [trustee]
in making distribution. n 5
The court therein further stated that:
Undoubtedly, the members of a family are not privileged to alter the
terms and provisions of a will merely for the convenience of the family
or for the sole purpose of securing greater individual financial advantages
than those specified in the will and intended by the testator. However,
the rule is well established that courts of equity favor the settlement of
disputes among members of a family by agreement rather than by resort
to law ... Obviously, such an agreement must be obtained without fraud
or deception ....

116

To hold otherwise, the court intimated, would produce prolonged litigation which would result in an expensive material
depletion of the estate with family relationships torn
asunder.
CHANGING ACCUMULATION PROVISIONS

Courts of chancery have liberally ordered advances
from income and principal for the maintenance of minor
cestuis contrary to express trust provisions directing accumulation. One of the essentials for the granting of an application in behalf of a minor for maintenance and education
out of interest expressly provided for accumulation," 7 or
out of principal,"' is that an exigency may have arisen
which was non-existent at the creation of the trust, and was
not anticipated by the creator. As was stated in Stephens v.
Howard's Executor:"9
The source of the power [to break in upon the terms of a trust which
neither expressly nor impliedly authorize such a course] is easy to
115 325 Ill. 165 at 180, 156 N.E. 334 at 339.

116 325 Ill. 165 at 183, 156 N.E. 334 at 340.
117 Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S.W. 840 (1913).
118 Barlow v. Grant, 1 Vern. 255, 23 Eng. Rep. 451 (1684); Longwith v. Riggs,
123 Il. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887); Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 IIl. 239 (1867); Matter of
119 32 N.J. Eq. 244 (1880).
Muller, 29 Hun (N.Y.) 418 (1883).
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trace. It is found in the fact that the infant is the absolute owner of the
property, no other person having either a present or prospective legal
interest in it, and that, if the present enjoyment of the property is withheld, the infant must suffer, possibly for the advantage of some person
who has no interest in the infant and was never thought of by the
120
testator as a possible recipient of his bounty.

Where there was no other property of the minor adequate for his maintenance and education, where the minor
was of tender age, without any parent living, and no third
person was interested in the fund, the court held in the case

of Matter of Charles Potts that in such a case, in equity,
interest would be ordered paid for maintenance almost as
a matter of course. It declared further that: "Even where a
legacy or devise is given to several children, with the benefit
of survivorship, and a direction for accumulation during
minority, yet, if the chance of survivorship is equal among
all, equity would allow maintenance from the interest.' ' 121
In Knorr v. Millard, 22 the testator left one-fifth of his
residue to Knorr's children or the survivors of them, to be
invested at interest by the executor and divided equally between them when they should severally become of age, and
in case any of them died under age, leaving children, then to
such children should be given the share of their parents.
Infant legatees applied for an order to advance money from
income on the ground that their father could not adequately
support them. In discussing the rights of possible claimants
not in esse, the court said:
But inasmuch as these bequests are not contingent except as to time of
payment, and as the chances of all the children are equal, the power has
been recognized in the court of chancery, in its administration of trusts,
to provide for making necessary advances out of the income when the
infants are otherwise likely to suffer, even where by the terms of the
12
trust itself an accumulation is contemplated. '

An English judge believed that "money laid out in the
child's education was most advantageous and beneficial for
the infant, and therefore he should make no scruple in breaking into the principal, where so small a sum was devised,
120
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that the interest thereof would not suffice to give the legatee
a competent maintenance and education."' 24 He was so
emphatic upon the point that he insisted that any trustee refusing to so apply the principal should be subject to removal.
In speaking of the power of the court to anticipate the
time of payment of a legacy left by a parent in trust to accumulate for his children, so far as it may be necessary for
the maintenance of the beneficiaries, the Illinois Supreme
Court once said that it "does not subvert the will, or tend to
defeat the intention of the testator, for his children were the
darling objects of his solicitude, and were he living, he would
undoubtedly make. ample provision for them. A court of
chancery may do what it is evident from the will the testator
would do if living."' 12 5 The same rule has been followed
where feeble-minded adults were involved. 12 6
The Supreme Court of Tennessee clearly emphasized
that doctrine by allowing the withdrawal of income for the
education of the beneficiary, contrary to the express terms
of the trust that she receive the principal and all accumulated interest when she became twenty-five years of age.
The court, in so deciding, said:
A court of equity, acting in loco parentis, or occupying the place of the
trust creator, in such case, does what it conceives would have been done
by the creator had he foreseen the situation of his beneficiary in a substitution of another course of management in order to the completer
realization of his purposed bounty. If this be not competent to be done by
a court of equity, it is not difficult to contemplate a situation in which the
testator's purposed benefit would be defeated entirely; for example, a
seizure of the beneficiary by a disease that would inevitably make her
its victim before she had reached the age of twenty-five years. The concept and doctrine may be of comparatively recent declaration and application, but the principle involved commends itself to the court as consonant with justice and the development of an equity system along lines
of sound polity.

1 27

It is essential, of course, that the infant should have such
an absolute title or interest in the trust or its income that the
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right of no other person will be affected by the allowance.
Unless he has such an interest, the consent of any person
entitled in remainder, whose estate may be diminished in
value by the allowance, must be obtained before the application will be entertained. Where children born and to be
born have a common interest in a fund, the fund, if necessary, may be applied for the maintenance of the children.12 8
Where the only person in interest is the legatee, the courts
will not enforce a trust for accumulation." The power of
equity to provide for the maintenance and education of infant
beneficiaries out of a trust fund where no provision was made
by the creator has, in England, been specifically authorized
since 1860, by a statute known as Lord Cranworth's Act.1"'
III.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER MINORS

It is the duty of a court of equity to invoke its power
whenever necessary to fully protect the personal and property rights of minors.1 3 ' The origin of this jurisdiction is a
mooted question. In all probability it was claimed by the
Crown as parens patrie to protect its subjects. 13 2 It was a
part of the king's executive power, especially as general
guardian over all infants, and did not belong to the court of
chancery under its general judicial functions. This branch
of legal authority was delegated to the chancellor as the
personal representative of the crown to be exercised by him
alone and not by the court of chancery. 133 Corresponding
jurisdiction over the person and property of lunatics and all
others who may be found non compos mentis, seems likewise
to have been derived by delegation from the crown. This
Haley v. Bannister, 4 Madd. 275, 56 Eng. Rep. 707 (1820).
Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841); Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] A.C. 186, 64 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 369 (1895).
130 23 & 24 Vict., c. 145, § 26 (1860).
131 United States v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 31 S. Ct. 37, 54 L. Ed. 1123 (1910);
Richards v. East Tennesse V. & G. Ry. Co., 106 Ga. 614, 33 S.E. 193 (1899); Gibbs
v. Andrews, 299 I1. 510, 132 N.E. 544 (1921); Mechling v. Meyers, 284 Ill. 484,
120 N.E. 542 (1918); Fienhold v. Babcock, 275 Ill. 282, 113 N.E. 962 (1916); King
v. King, 215 Ill. 100, 74 N.E. 89 (1905); Lloyd v. Kirkwood, 112 IM. 329 (1884);
White v. Glover, 59 IMl. 459 (1871).
132 In re Woman's North Pacific Presbyterian Bd. Missions, 18 Ore. 339, 22 P.
1105 (1890); Losey v. Stanley, 147 N.Y. 560, 42 N.E. 8 (1895).
133 Eyre v. Shaftsbury (Countess of), 2 P. Wins. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722);
Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 27 A. 229 (1893); Bowles v. Troll, 190 Mo. App.
108, 175 S.W. 324 (1915); Losey v. Stanley, 147 N.Y. 560, 42 N.E. 8 (1895).
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theory has, however, been rejected by eminent English and
American writers and jurists in favor of an inherent original
jurisdiction of equity over infants as part of its general jurisprudence.1 3 Despite the source of authority, courts of equity
have from earliest times regarded infants as their special
wards and the guardianship thus provided has proven of
great advantage in the preservation of the personal and
property rights of infants.'3 5 This is also true when the court
has dealt with a trust created for the benefit of an insane
person, or one under legal disability. 3 '
In the exercise of that jurisdiction, courts of equity may
direct to be done whatever may be necessary to preserve the
137
estate of an infant and the income derived therefrom.
Thus where an infant has the right to elect between different
remedies or provisions, such as the right to elect one of two
or more bequests in a will, equity may take jurisdiction to
elect for the infant. 13 In fact, it is one of the primary func134

Hills v. Pierce, 113 Ore. 386, 231 P. 652 (1924).

135 United States v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 31 S. Ct. 37, 54 L. Ed. 1123
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138 In Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284 at 290, 141 N.E. 209 at 211 (1923), the court
said: "It cannot be seriously questioned that a court of equity, when an application is made in apt time, has power to elect for an insane spouse incapable, by
reason of want of capacity, of personally making an election. . . The jurisdiction
of a court of probate over the estate of an incompetent was and is equitable...
It has power to order that done which is for the best interest of the estate of
the ward." See also Sippell v. Wolff, 333 Ill. 284, 164 N.E. 678 (1928); McCartney
v. Jacobs, 288 11. 568, 123 N.E. 557 (1919); Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E.
180 (1887). In Dodge, Conservator v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338 (1881), the right of revocation originally reserved in the instrument was also held assertable by a conservator or by a court of equity. After tracing the powers of chancery, the Supreme
Court reviewed the general and fundamental principles of courts of equity and
the differences and similarities in the English and the American courts' concep•tions of real and personal property. The court relied upon the powers of chancery courts to order sales of the property of infants.
137 Fienhold v. Babcock, 275 M. 282, 113 N.E. 962 (1916); White v. Glover, 59
Ill. 459 (1871); Lynch v. Rotan, 39 Ill. 14 (1865); Brown v. Wadsworth, 168 N.Y.
225, 61 N.E. 250 (1901).
138 Abney v. Abney, 182 Ala. 213, 62 So. 64 (1913); Andrews v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85
(1848); Bonnie's Guardian v. Haldeman, 31 Ky. L. 522, 102 S.W. 308 (1907); Thom
v. Thorn, 101 Md. 444, 61 A. 193 (1905); Savill v. Savill, 2 Coll. 721, 63 Eng. Rep.
932 (1846); Ashburnham v. Ashburnham, 13 Jur. (Eng.) 1111 (1849).
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tions of the court to protect all of the interests of minors,1'
even on its own motion. 140 Infancy is sufficient for most
courts to sustain jurisdiction,1 4 1 whether relief is asked in
the pleadings or not." A complaint cannot be taken as confessed against a minor 1 43 and a guardian ad litem cannot
bind his infant ward by any admissions in the answer.
The general jurisdiction of a court of equity of court of
course can be invoked only when the court is given jurisdiction over the infant and the subject matter in accordance
with the usual practice of equity,'
such as by the commencement of a suit of regular procedure in the court or by
intervention in such a suit, which will make him a ward of
the court. The court thereby becomes his guardian in contemplation of law. 1 45 A minor settlor may disaffirm his trust
transfer until he reaches his majority, 140 and where a trust
is created for the benefit of an infant during his minority, it
will so continue until he becomes of age, 147 unless a longer
duration is intended. 4 8 Where it is provided that the trust is
to continue during his minority or until his marriage, it will
terminate upon the beneficiary's marriage.'4 9
CONCLUSION

The trust has always been recognized as a device for
family security and while it may be intended to insure fi139 Gibbs v. Andrews, 299 Ill. 510, 132 N.E. 544 (1921); Feldott v. Featherstone,
290 Ill. 485, 125 N.E. 361 (1919); Mechling v. Meyers, 284 Ill. 484, 120 N.E. 542
(1918); Losey v. Stanley, 147 N.Y. 560, 42 N.E. 8 (1895).
140 Jones v. Hudson, 93 Neb. 561, 141 N.W. 141 (1913); Buskirk v. Ragland, 65
W.Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101 (1909).
141 Mechling v. Meyers, 284 Ill. 484, 120 N.E. 542 (1918); Thomas v. Thomas,
250 Ill. 354, 95 N.E. 345 (1911); Williams v. Williams, 204 Ill. 44, 68 N.E. 449 (1903);
White v. Glover, 59 Ill. 459 (1871); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 176 N.Y.S. 820 (1919).
142 Mason v. Truitt, 257 Ill. 18, 100 N.E. 202 (1912); Roe v. Angevine, 7 Hun
(N.Y.) 679 (1876).
143 Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239 (1867).
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146 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Allen, 108 F. (2d) 961 (1939).
147 Parker v. Smith, 140 Ga. 789, 80 S.E. 12 (1913); Hinds v. Hinds, 126 N.E.
521, 140 A. 189 (1928); Ray v. Kelly, 82 Miss. 597, 35 So. 165 (1903); Whiteley v.
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859 (1926).
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nancial independence to the surviving members after death,
it has a broader function in preserving the family's general
well-being. We have clung too long and too tenaciously to the
outworn rule that the trust instrument is the trustee's charter and all of its terms must be rigidly observed. Too much
consideration is given to what the testator said and meant
under different circumstances and conditions, and too little
to what he would have said or done in view of the unexpected
turn of events, if he realized it was for the best interests of
his loved ones. It seems rather the wiser course for a court
of equity to place itself in the testator's position and to do
what he would do to accomplish his primary purpose.
This policy was well defined in Curtiss v. Brown, where it
was said:
Exigencies often arise not contemplated by the party creating the trust,
and which, had they been anticipated, would undoubtedly have been provided for, where the aid of the court of chancery must be invoked to
grant relief imperatively required; and in such cases the court must, as
far as may be, occupy the place of the party creating the trust, and do
with the fund what he would have dictated had he anticipated the
emergency. 150

It is the responsibility of the chancellor to ascertain and
carry into effect what is advantageous for the minor just as
a father would act for a child under similar circumstances.
That power should be exercised with great caution and each
case should be dealt with according to its own special circumstances, but where it is clearly beneficial to the infant
cestui, even though it is not absolutely necessary, the court,
like the father, should be in a position to approve it. The
modes in which these benefits may be accomplished are not
so vital as the ultimate welfare of the minor cestui. The trust
is created for his benefit and it is his interest which should be
given primary consideration, consistent with the rights of
others.
150 29 IMI.201 at 230 (1862).

